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Confucianism: Lee Ming-huei’s Interpretation of Han 
Wonjin (1682–1750) 
Martina GREIF and Jana S. ROŠKER* 
Abstract 
Numerous representatives of the contemporary Confucian revival from Taiwan are 
increasingly demonstrating the fact that the development of Confucian philosophy has to 
be viewed in a broader cultural context, especially in the context of different East Asian 
regions. While the development of the Japanese Confucian studies has been elaborated to a 
great extent during the last decades, studies in Korean Confucianism are still rare. Hence, 
the present article aims to offer a report on a pioneer contribution in this regard. It 
introduces Lee Ming-huei’s investigation into the work of one of the most influential 
Korean Confucians of the Joseon period; on the basis of Huang Chun-chieh’s methodology 
which exposes the contextualization paradigm, the article explains the main hypotheses 
and offers a theoretical reflection of the main issues discussed in this research work. 
Keywords: Han Wonjin 韓元震 , Lee Ming-huei 李明輝 , East Asian Confucianism, 
Korean Confucianism 
Izvleček 
Številni predstavniki sodobnega konfucijanskega preporoda na Tajvanu izpostavljajo 
dejstvo, da je razvoj konfucijanske filozofije potrebno obravnavati iz širšega kulturnega 
konteksta, zlasti ko govorimo o različnih regijah Vzhodne Azije. Medtem ko je bil ravoj 
japonskih konfucijanskih študij v veliki meri izdelan v zadnjih desetletjih, so študije 
korejskega konfucianizma še vedno maloštevilne. Zato je cilj tega članka predstaviti 
pionirsko raziskavo iz tega področja. Članek predstavi raziskavo profesorja Lee Ming-
hueija s področja del enega izmed najbolj vplivnih korejskih konfucijancev obdobja Joseon. 
Na podlagi Huang Chun-chieh-jeve metodologije, ki izpostavi kontekstualno paradigmo, 
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razloži poglavitne hipoteze in ponudi kritičen razmislek o poglavitnih vprašanjih 
obravnavanih v tem raziskovalnem delu. 
Ključne besede: Han Wonjin, Lee Ming-huei, konfucianizem vzhodne Azije, korejski 
konfucianizem 
The Importance of Investigating Korean Confucianism 
As Huang Chun-chieh writes in his work East Asian Confucianism, Texts in 
Contexts, over the long span of history, Confucian texts travelled across every 
country and region in East Asia. Their vitality and openness inspired the curiosity 
of readers in many East Asian areas and invited those readers to engage in creative 
dialogue with them.  
Through the continuing intellectual and spiritual conversation among 
Confucian scholars, a Confucian community was created. This volume tells 
the story of the importance of the Confucian traditions and why and how 
Confucian texts were reinterpreted within the different ambiances and 
contexts of East Asia. Therefore, we will discover that “East Asian 
Confucianisms” is an intellectual community that is transnational and multi-
lingual. It evolved in interaction between Confucian “universal values” and 
the local conditions present in each East Asian country (Huang 2014, 3). 
This by no means implies that the contemporary Confucian scholars should repeat 
the cliché that Confucianism is the sine qua non of East Asian civilization. In his 
numerous works, Huang Chun-chieh rather seems to suggest that the paradigm of 
“East Asian Confucianisms” can open up a brand new vista for the study of 
Confucian traditions in general. He argues that Chinese Confucian scholars are 
finally to leave the ghetto of their “national learning,” with its practice of holding 
state-centrism as the basis of Confucianism (Huang 2014, 5). Hence, we must 
reconsider the development of Confucianism in a broader East Asian perspective. 
According to Huang, by contextualizing Confucianism in East Asian cultures and 
societies, we find ourselves in a better position to appreciate the diversity and 
variety of East Asian Confucian traditions. 
In this context, the Korean Confucianism is no exception: 
During the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), the Japanese school of 
Confucianism based on the work of Zhu Xi (朱熹, Huian 晦庵, 1130–1200) 
began to take shape. This was largely due to the great influence of Zhu Xi 
studies in Joseon (1391–1910) Korea, especially in the writings of the Korean 
scholar Yi Hwang 李 滉 (or Yi Toegye 李退溪, 1501–1570), most of whose 
works were also published in Japan. A later Ming (1368–1644) scholar Luo 
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Qinshun (羅欽順, 1466–1547) revised Zhu Xi’s philosophy in his Kunzhiji 
(困知記 Knowledge Acquired through Adversity). This book had a profound 
impact on the Tokugawa world of thought. Luo’s book was printed in Japan 
on the basis of the Korean version (Huang 2014, 7). 
Thus, the Chinese––and especially Taiwanese Confucian scholars are increasingly 
paying attention to the Korean intellectual history and to the role of Confucian 
studies within Korean history. 
Lee Ming-huei’s Investigation 
Lee Ming-huei from the Academia Sinica in Taipei belongs to the community of 
contemporary Confucian scholars who have been, due to the above mentioned 
reasons, investigating Korean Confucianism for several years.  
In his long-term studies on Korean Confucianism, he firmly believes that a 
competent researcher has to move deliberately into the tension between 
contextualization and de-contextualization (Huang 2014, 90) in order to uncover 
the multiple dimensions of his research object. Hence, he especially lays stress 
upon the contexts of canonical texts. In contrast to historical and social contexts, 
the contexts of canonical texts have their own relative independence, which is the 
research object of conceptual history. In addition, in studies either on historical 
and social contexts or on conceptual history, de-contextualization can not be 
avoided, since all of them concern a comparative perspective. Comparison is 
namely tightly linked to abstraction, in turn means de-contextualization. Even the 
very formation of any concept originates from abstraction and hence from de-
contextualization. Hence, all research approaches include aspects of both 
contextualization and de-contextualization at the same time, but with different 
focusses. 
In his article “Korean Confucian Han Wonjin’s 韓元震 Critique of Wang 
Yangming’s 王陽明 Thought” (Lee 2013), Lee Ming-huei discusses the marginal 
position of Wang Yangming’s teaching in Korean Confucianism. The article 
analyzes Korean Confucian Han Wonjin’s critique of Wang Yanming’s three main 
concepts: “extension of original knowing” (zhiliangzhi 致良知), “mind is principle” 
(xinjili 心即理) and “unity of knowledge and action” (zhixingheyi 知行合一), and 
at the same time reveals the complex relationship between Korean successors of 
Zhu Xi’s teaching and Wang Yangming’s thought in Korea.  
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Although Lee’s investigation is focused upon Han Wonjin’s interpretation, we 
have––as a random, but relevant background––to consider the fact that this Korean 
scholar was by no means the only Korean representative of critical reflections on 
Chinese Neo-Confucian synthesis between Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist 
thought. In other words, we have to take into consideration slightly earlier 
developments in early Qing Period. Already before Han Wonjin’s interpretation, 
we can witness certain critical tendencies among scholars belonging to the Han 
Learning scholarship, who also highlighted and strongly rejected the Buddhist-
Confucian syncretism in Wang Yangming’s thought. In fact, Korean scholars such 
as Han Wonjin (who was loyal to Zhu Xi’s thought) did not go nearly as far as 17th 
century Chinese Confucian scholars did in identifying, and rejecting, the Buddhist-
Confucian syncretism in Neo-Confucian thought as a whole.  
The present article introduces Lee Ming-huei’s main hypotheses and offers a 
critical reflection of the main issues discussed in them.  
The essays mainly investigate five central questions, connected to the Korean 
Confucianism, beginning with a short introduction of its historical background and 
then proceeding to the analyses of various critiques directed against The Chinese 
School of the Heart-Mind (xin xue 心學) that were written by one of the most 
influential Korean Confucianists, Han Wonjin, focusing, among others, especially 
upon his critiques of the following concepts and hypotheses respectively, that were 
developed by Wang Yangming:  
1. The extension of original knowledge  
2. The heart-mind is the structural principle 
3. The unity of knowledge and action 
Here, one cannot avoid the question, why the so-called School of the Heart-
Mind, which was established by the prominent Chinese neo-Confucian 
philosopher Wang Yangming (1472–1529), was so severely criticized and actually 
more or less completely neglected in Korean Confucian ideologies. Lee’s article 
offers a very reasonable explanation, which will be discussed below, but is, 
however, still open to debates and invites East Asian scholars to carry out further 
research on the issue.  
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A Short Historical and Philosophical Background 
Lee Ming-huei opens his investigation with a short, but nevertheless detailed 
discussion of the historical and ideological background of the Confucian history of 
thought in Korea. He focusses especially upon the question of why Korean 
Confucian scholars did not generally accept Wang Yangming’s teaching. In this 
framework, Lee also offers an explanation to which Korean stream of thought Han 
Wonjin actually belonged.  
The political situation in the Joseon dynasty Korea was conditioned by the 
struggle between different schools of thought, which started in the middle of 16
th
 
century. There were two main Confucian schools of thought, one represented by 
Yi Hwang (Master Toegye, 1501–1570) and the other by Yi Yulgok (1536–1584).  
These two schools were disputing with each other concerning several main 
issues belonging to the Neo-Confucian philosophy. The most famous among them 
was the debate about the “four virtues and seven emotions” (siduan qiqing 四端七
情). Each of the two schools persisted on different viewpoints concerning the 
relation among the four virtues (that were, according to Mencian interpretations, 
mostly innate), and the seven emotions, (which were mostly seen as rooted in 
specific actual circumstances in which individuals were living). 
In general, Yi Yulgok closely guarded the rules and measures of Zhu Xi’s 
teachings, and persisted that the structure of the Neo-Confucian doctrines had to 
be based on two concepts:  
1. on the duality of the structural principle and creative vitality (li qi erfen 理
氣二分) and  
2. on the trinity of the heart-mind, nature and feelings (xin xing qing sanfen 
心性情三分).  
Yi Huang, on the other hand, acknowledged his loyalty to Zhu Xi’s thought, 
but made through his own ire-interpretations some important modifications in his 
doctrines. 
Different political fractions intertwined with the debates between these two 
schools of thought. At that time, two political factions were formed, namely the 
Western and the Eastern fraction. As for the connection of the political factions to 
schools of thought, the Eastern faction belonged to disciples of Yi Toegye and Jo 
Nammyeong (Yo Sik, 1501–1570) and the Western faction belonged to the system 
of Seong Ugye 成牛溪 and Yi Yulgok. In 1592, short before the Imjin War, the 
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Eastern faction again split into two further political factions: the Northern and the 
Southern faction. After the middle of 17
th
 century the Northern faction’s power 
declined, and the political struggle continued only between the Southern and the 
Western faction. As for the teaching system, the Western faction in general carried 
on Yi Yulgok’s school of thought while the Southern faction, in general carried on 
Yi Hwang’s philosophy. In the Western faction later appeared two additional 
groups named Noron and Soron. The central figure of Noron group was Song 
Siyeol (1607–1689). He viewed Ki Sagye (1548–1631) as his teacher, while Kim 
was Yi Yulgok’s official disciple. Song Siyeol’s official disciple was Gwon Suam 
(1641–1721), while Han Wonjin (1682–1751) was the official disciple of Gwon 
Suam. Therefore, Han Wonjin succeeded Yi Yulgok’s school of thought which 
remained loyal to the rules and measures of Zhu Xi’s teachings, and insisted that 
the structure of Doctrine of meaning and principle be based on the two 
aforementioned paradigms, namely on the “duality of the structural principle and 
vital creativity” (li qi erfen 理氣二分) and on the “trinity of heart, nature and 
emotions” (xin xing qing sanfen 心性情三分).  
The Relation between the Heart-Mind and the Structural 
Principle 
In this regard, it is important to consider the fact that, according to Han Wonjin, 
Wang Yangming’s supposition that the “innate knowledge was identical with the 
structure of nature” (liangzhi ji tianli 良知即天理) had to be equated with the 
Buddhist concept of the “true heart-mind” (zhenxin 真心). In this way, he tried to 
show that Wang Yangming’s thought was, in its essence, thoroughly influenced by 
the Buddhist philosophy.  
As Lee Ming-huei exposes, it is also important to understand the background 
of Han Wonjin’s critique of the “extension of original knowedge” (zhiliangzhi 致
良知). Through his analysis of Han Wonjin’s commentaries from The Collected 
Works of Wang Yangming, it became obvious that Han Wonjin’s critique of Wang 
Yangming’s “extension of innate knowledge” is rooted in their different 
viewpoints on the origin of moral values. According to Wang Yangming, the 
origin of moral values is “innate knowledge” (liangzhi 良知 ), whereas Han 
Wonjin claims that the origin of moral values is “the object of knowledge” (zhishi 
duixiang 知識對象 ). Lee Ming-huei names the first perspective “moral 
subjectivism” (daode zhuti zhuyi 道德主體主義) and the second “moral realism” 
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(daode shizailun 道德實在論). At the same time he emphasizes, that in fact, Wang 
Yangming did not deny the importance of “the object of knowledge” as far as it 
consists moral coherency.  
Regarding Han Wonjin’s critique of the supposition, according to which “the 
heart-mind is identical (or compatible) with the structural principle” (xin ji li 心即
理), it also becomes obvious that Han Wonjin’s critique is overly simplified. 
Through a detailed analysis of Han Wonjin’s comments on The Collected Works 
of Wang Yangming, Lee comes to the conclusion that Han Wonjin reduced Wang 
Yangming’s paradigm “heart-mind is structural principle” solely to the concept of 
the “heart-mind”. Ultimately, this means that, according to Han, we do not need to 
search for structural principles in exploring external objects, but merely to abide to 
the heart-mind. Lee points out that Wang Yangming never claimed that the heart-
mind was actually identical to the structural principle. What he meant by saying 
that “the heart-mind is (compatible with the) structural principle” should be 
understood from the metaphysical point of view, meaning that the heart-mind 
drafts the cosmic structural principle.  
Since Han Wonjin inherited Zhu Xi’s way of thinking, which claims that the 
heart-mind (xin 心) belongs to the physical world, while the structural principle (li 
理) belongs to the metaphysical world, and the connection between the two is of 
cognitive nature, therefore his way of thinking is incompatible with Wang 
Yangming’s. Ultimately, this has logically lead to a misinterpretation of Wang 
Yangming’ thought.  
Han Wonjin’s Understanding of the “Unity of Knowledge and 
Action” and Some Other Critiques of Wang Yangming’s 
Philosophy 
This significant set of problems has been elaborated through Lee Ming-huei’s 
analyses of Han Wonjin’s commentaries on the relation between knowledge and 
action, which belongs to the crucial contributions of Wang Yangming’s 
philosophy to the Neo-Confucian discourses.   
According to Lee, Han Wonjin made an interpretative mistake at the very 
beginning by exaggeratedly stressing the importance of food and journey analogy
1
 
                                                 
1 As Lee also points out, Wang Yangming in this analogy unfortunately uses the diction of what 
happens before and after while obtaining the knowledge of the good or bad taste of the food or of the 
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which Wang Yangming applied to illustrate the concept of “unity of knowledge 
and action”. The analogy itself is not as important as the message it tries to convey, 
namely the unity of knowledge and action. But Han Wonjin misses the point and 
occupies himself with the formal order within the relation between knowledge and 
action and focuses far too extensively upon the (actually insignificant) question of 
what comes first, or what has to be treated primarily, knowledge or action. In his 
analysis, Lee Ming-huei namely shows that Wang Yanming merely used this 
analogy to refute Zhu Xi’s saying “first knowledge, then action” (zhixian xinghou 
知先行後), which complies with common knowledge (changshi 常識). However, 
Wang Yangming’s understanding of the concept of knowledge cannot be 
understood as common knowledge, but rather as knowledge derived from human 
“innate knowledge”. In addition, according to Wang Yangming, action can not be 
understood in the narrow sense of acting or practising, but also contains the 
intention (yi 意).  
Han Wonjin’s second commentary on Wang Yangming’s concept of “unity of 
knowledge and action” is based on Yi Hwang’s commentary on this concept. As 
Lee has previously discussed in his article by noting Yi Hwang and Wang 
Yangming, the former made a distinction between two levels of knowledge and 
action: first is the organic level of gi 氣 and the second the moral level of yili 義理, 
where he claims that the concept “unity of knowledge and action” can be only 
achieved on the organic level of gi, whereas on the moral level of yili the unity of 
knowledge and action cannot be established.  
Here, Han Wonjin made two objections. First, he objected Yi Hwang that the 
concept of “unity of knowledge and action” can not be achieved neither on the 
organic, nor on the moral level. Furthermore, he opposes Yi Hwang’s distinction 
between the two levels of knowledge and action citing Mengzi 孟子, and claiming 
that on the moral level of yili it is also possible “to know yourself without studying 
and to be capable without making effort”. Lee Ming-huei shows that this 
presumption was based on insufficient understanding of Wang Yangming’s 
philosophy. He claims that Han Wonjin could come to understand and 
acknowledge the meaning of Wang’s “unity of knowledge and action” if he would 
have deepened and upgraded his studies on Mengzi. 
                                                                                                                           
dangers of the journey, which to a non-expert of Wang Yanming’s thought gives the impression that 
first comes practice and second comes knowledge, instead of the unity of knowledge and practice.  
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In the conclusion of his essay, Lee points out some other, more random 
misinterpretations of Wang Yangming’s work that become visible through 
analyzing Han Wonjin’s commentaries. Most of them are also linked to Han’s 
insistence on Zhu Xi’s duality of the heart-mind and the structural principle. Thus, 
they mostly lead to a differentiation between the organic and the moral, or the 
physical and metaphysical level of onto-epistemological discourses. Besides, Han 
Wonjin also criticizes Wang Yangming’s personal intentions and his “bad moral 
character” which can not serve as a matter of academic discussion. Hence, these 
kinds of direct ideological attacks on Wang Yangming’s philosophy also illustrate 
how Korean Confucianism has always been intertwined with political struggle.  
Conclusion 
In addition, Lee Ming-huei’s analysis also clarifies an additional significant 
question concerning the Korean Confucianism. This question is linked to the 
reason for the fact that Korean Confucian scholars did not generally accept Wang 
Yangming’s teaching, although many Chinese Modern Confucian scholars (e.g. 
Mou Zongsan 1975, 123) and Western sinologists (e.g. Bunnin 2002, 27) have 
pointed out that Wang’s Confucianism can be regarded as a case of successful 
reinterpretations of Zhu Xi’s Confucianism. 
This question is quite interesting and important for most Chinese and 
Taiwanese scholars dealing with the relation between original Neo-Confucian 
philosophy on the one side, and its Korean modifications on the other. The 
question itself is, of course, quite complex and connected with several factors, 
including political struggles, differences in both languages and traditions, as well 
as with local historical developments of both geo-political areas.  
In his essay, Lee Ming-huei added an important clarification to the scope of 
the respective debates. According to him, this is because throughout history of 
Korea Zhu Xi’s teaching held the dominant and absolutely leading position. Two 
main figures that contributed to spreading of Zhu Xi’s teachings and on the other 
hand the suppression of Wang Yangming’s teaching in Korea were: a scholar of 
Zhu Xi’s teaching from Ming dynasty, Luo Qinshun 羅欽順 (1465–1547), and the 
leading figure of Korean Confucianism, Yi Hwang (1501–1571). Luo Qinshun’s 
work Kunzhiji (困知記) spread throughout Korea before Wang Yanming’s works 
were introduced to the area. Since Luo Qinshun criticizes Wang Yanming’s 
thought, this influenced other Korean Confucian scholars and led to their 
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prejudices towards Wang Yangming. In addition, Yi Hwang’s critiques of Wang 
Yangming’s thought and his moral character were equally influential in Korea. In 
this context, Lee clearly shows that Yi Hwang’s critique of Wang Yanming’s 
thought was based on severe misunderstandings of his work. He also shows that 
Yi was not familiar enough with all of Wang Yangming’s works2; therefore, he 
failed to fully grasp Wang Yangming’s thought.  
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2
 Lee exposes that Yi Hwang only studied Volume One of Wang’s Chuanxilu 傳習錄, without 
taking into consideration its second volume. Hence, most of his critiques were based on secondary 
sources, such as Zhu Xi’s Zhuzi wannian dinglun 朱子晚年定論. 
